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Academic Freedom in Urofsky's Wake:
Post September 11 Remarks on
"Who Owns Academic Freedom?"
Doug Rendleman*
Ms. Stacy Smith researched and wrote her excellent Note, Who Owns
Academic Freedom?: The Standard for Academic Free Speech at Public
Universities,' in one world; it will be published in another. The watershed
event was September 11, 2001.
"Normal academics" characterized the world in which Ms. Smith wrote
her Note. The subject was sex - but isn't it always? The members of the
Virginia General Assembly were avid to curb state employees' use of govern-
ment time and computers to study sex on the Internet.2 Professors at state
universities were eager to examine the forbidden topic; all the better, they
maintained, to push back the frontiers of knowledge. The collision was
inevitable, but "normal."
Although the dispute about professors' internet research into sexually
explicit information comes under the heading of "normal academics," Ms.
Smith demonstrates that the way the court resolved the dispute was aberrant.
Professors' academic freedom to teach and research, as Ms. Smith capably
shows, was, we thought, a prominent ingredient in educational culture and
law. However, in Urofsky v. Gilmore,3 the Fourth Circuit held that a profes-
sor, as an individual teacher and researcher, lacks any separate academic
freedom protected by the First Amendment; instead, the university that
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1. Stacy E. Smith, Note, Who Owns Academic Freedom: The Standard for Academic
Free Speech in Public Universities, 59 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 299 (2002).
2. See VA. CODEANN. § 2.1-805,amendedby § 2.1-805 (MichieSupp. 1999), recodifed
at § 2-2827B (Michie 2001) (stating that no state agency employee may use agency-owned or
agenoy-leased computer equipment "to access, download, print or store any information infra-
structure files or services having sexually explicit content" without prior written approval from
agency head).
3. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000)(en bane), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001).
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employs the professor "owns" whatever academic freedom exists.4 A state
university professor's free speech rights are identical to a prison guard's -
because academic freedom is merely the institution's right to govern itself in
academic matters.5
The court's doctrine is pernicious. Urofsky is a triumph for collectivism
and conformity and a recipe for timidity. The American Association of
University Professors articulated the correct principles nearly a century ago
in its 1915 Declaration of Principles.6 Academic freedom ought to be - we
used to think is - an individual, not merely a collective, right.7 Academic
freedom protects university autonomy from outside interference; but more
importantly, it enables independent teachers and researchers with academic
freedom to be indispensable to the modem university's teaching and research
missions.'
Ms. Smith demonstrates that the Urofsky decision is a setback for the
legal protection of academic freedom, and her Note strengthens the argument
against the Urofsky court's result.' Ms. Smith's thought process is lucid. She
writes fluently, and her Note is easy to read. Having picked a subject she
could treat in depth within the compass of a Note, she examines the legal rules
in light of public policy, and she reaches a courageous conclusion - the Urof-
sky court's decision is incorrect in principle and ought to be repudiated at the
first opportunity.10 I steadfastly hope that other courts will take Ms. Smith's
advice - not to emulate Urofsky.
4. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,408, 412,416 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001).
5. See id. at 412 (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court, to the extent it has constitutionalized
a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-
governance in academic affairs").
6. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, GENERAL REPORT ON THE COMMmTEE OF ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENU (1915), reprinted in FREEDoM AND TENURE IN THE
ACADEMY, app. A, at 393406 (William W. Van Alstyne ed., 1993).
7. See id. at 393 (defining academic freedom as comprising individual professors' "free-
dom of inquiry and research").
8. See generally David M. Rabban, Functional Anaysis of "Individual" and "Insitu-
tional"Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 L. & CoITMP. PROBS. 227, 300
(1990) (emphasizing that Supreme Court has recognized academic freedom as "unenumerated
[F]irst [A]mendment right with both individual and institutional components").
9. See Smith, supra note 1, at 360 (asserting that Fourth Circuit should have appreciated
distinction between garden-variety public employee speech and academic free speech or in-
quiry).
10. Id. at 336-60. For a shorter article with similar conclusions, see David Rabban, Aca-
demic Freedom, Individual or lnstitutional?,ACADEME, Nov.- Dec. 2001, at 16. See also Case
Comment, Fourth Circuit Upholds Viginia Statute Prohibiting State Employees from Down-
loading Sexualb Explicit Material - Urofky v. Gilmore, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1414, 1418-20
(200 1) (concluding that Urofsky court threatened doctrine of academic freedom).
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Academic freedom has always been "soft law," precarious and narrow."
If Urofsky foreshadows things to come, the already "soft" law just got a lot
mushier. If, after Urofsky, academic freedom is less important in academic
law, then it ought to become a more important part of academic culture. It
underscores the need for contractual and cultural protections for dissent.
Like any subculture, colleges and universities have an overlay of "com-
mon law": academic freedom, procedures, values, and precepts which have
no counterpart in government or business.12 A culture of academic freedom
must include tolerance for dissent in both public and private higher education.
Moreover, while protection of a tenure contract is not in order for nontenured
instructors and students, a culture of tolerance for dissent for all would be
salutary.
"It still astounds me," Professor and Urofsky plaintiff Terry Meyers ob-
served to me in an e-mail, "that I have to seek permission of a state official to
read poetry kept on a state data base at [the University of Virginia]." 3 The
rules that officials employ to implement censorship are, in addition to being
cumbersome and stifling, silly. Professor Meyers must read the actual books
from the College of William and Mary's library; because he cannot, without
an official's permission, access the University of Virginia's archives on his
computer. 4 Professor Meyers's inability to peruse the Victorian poet Swin-
burne on his computer, I candidly admit, is peripheral to the national debate
about public policy. Nonetheless, the principle he asserts - that of a profes-
sor's academic freedom to conduct research autonomously - is indispensable
to public policy. Unfortunately, the Urofsky court has undermined the legal
stature of academic freedom when the world needs academic freedom now
more than ever.
For we are now on the other side of the September 11 watershed. Hyper-
nationalism exacerbated by twisted religious fundamentalism led terrorists to
kill thousands of innocent people in Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia.
The United States govement has unleashed internal measures to uncover
potential perpetrators and to prevent future terrorism. Because of the military
11. WilliamW. Van Alstyne,AcademicFreedom and the FirstAmendment in the Supreme
Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79,
79-80(1990).
12. The University Counsel: A Roundtable Discussion, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at
27-28 (quoting Bob O'Neil).
13. E-mail from Terry Meyers, Professor and Chair of the English Department, College
of William and Mary, to Doug R. Rendleman (Oct. 1,2001) (on file with author).
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1999), recodified at § 2.2-2827B
(Michie 2001) (stating that "le]xcopt to the extent required in conjunction with a bona fide,
agency-approved research project or other agency-approved undertaking, no agency employee
shall utilize agency-owned or agency-leased computer equipment to access, download, print or
store any information infrastructure files or services having sexually explicit content").
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activity in Afghanistan, the paradigm has shifted from normal to crisis, and
not just in academics. Reflecting upon the relationship between crisis and
liberty, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency
when constitutional rights seemtoo extravagantto endure. The World War
H relocation-camp cases, and the Red Scare and McCarthy-era internal
subversion cases are only the most extreme reminders that when we allow
fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived
exigency, we invariably come to regret it"
The United States Government's responses to earlier war-related crises
augur badly for individuals' civil liberties in this one. Congress passed the
Sedition Act in 1798 because of the post-Revolutionary Terror in France.
Habeas corpus was suspended during the Civil War. During and after World
War I, people went to jail because their mild criticism violated the Sedition
and Espionage Acts. The Palmer raids followed World War I. During World
War II, 140,000 Japanese, two-thirds of them citizens, were interned. Mc-
Carthyism, grounded on fear of communism, flourished during the Cold War.
The September 11 crisis has created the conditions where academic
freedom, always precarious, is threatened - precisely when society needs
academic freedom to serve its core values and to deal with the crisis. In the
fluctuations between the individual and the collective, war moves the focus
to the collective at the expense of the individual. In conditions of crisis, the
group, through official coercion and public opinion, puts pressure on individu-
als to get with the program, to speak with one voice, and to fall into line. The
social sense of humor ebbs; commentators view lampoon, satire, and skepti-
cism as disarming democracy.
Professors' voices are needed in this time of crisis. Many professors
have developed specialized expertise in subjects formerly thought to be arcane,
such as Afghanistan and anthrax. Good professors possess critical intelli-
gence and are willing to deploy it even in dissenting opinions. Independence
is a prerequisite for asking the hard questions that may be unasked by politi-
cians and journalists. Because universities employ professors specifically to
test the prevailing wisdom and to propose revisions, professors differ from
other public employees. The government should protect a professor's schol-
15. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Vince Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 CoLUk4 L. REv. 449,457 (1985) (noting fragility of most constitutional com-
mitments in that "they embody ideals that are easily abandoned or tempered in times of stress").
I agree with Professor Blasi's recognition that the most serious threats to the core commitments
of the First Amendment "tend to be concentrated in unusual, intense periods and tend to derive
from powerful social dynamics." Id. at 462.
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arly speech more than an ordinary employee's speech. For it is important to
ask the hard questions now, before the issues are settled. The difficult ques-
tions are both internal ones about surveillance, preventive detention, and
searches, and external ones about proposed foreign policy adventures.
Dissent is, however, easier to tolerate when everyone feels safe. Crisis
always imperils free speech. Universities, traditional free speech bastions,
have terminated professors with unpopular political views during times of
national crisis. 6 In the weeks after September 11, raw emotions made it
difficult for most Americans to think critically." There were panel discussions
and teach-ins on many campuses. Some speakers made unbalanced and
intemperate statements.
For example, a professor at the University of British Columbia drew
parallels between terrorism and United States foreign policy." At a confer-
ence in Ottawa on injustice against women and violence, Professor Sunera
Thobani was still, she said, feeling the pain from the thousands of deaths on
September 11.19 Professor Thobani continued:
But do we feel anypain for the victims of U.S. aggression?... Today
in the world, the United States is the most dangerous and the most power-
ful global force unleashing horrific levels of violence. From Chile to El
Salvador to Nicaragua to Iraq, the path of U.S. foreign policy is soaked
with blood.
2
Richard Berthold, a professor at the University of New Mexico, in two open
classes, said, "Anyone who can blow up the Pentagon gets my vote."2'
Widespread campus pressure for conformity, unity, and patriotism ac-
companied these professors' critical comments. Legislators and university
administrators emphasized that professors should respect the emotional sensi-
tivity of students, especially considering the. potential for Middle Eastern
16. See Robin Wilson & Ana Marie Cox, TevroritAftacks PutAcademic Freedom to the
Test, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct 5, 2001, available at http'J/chronicle.com/free/v48/i06/
06a01201 .htm (stating that during "the Red Scare of the 1950s and during the Vietnam War,
tenured professors were dismissed and even jailed for espousing views many considered anti-
American").
r 17. Id. (noting that after thousands of deaths and worldwide crisis of conscience, some
administrators would prefer that professors not try to "think critically about what happened').
18. See generally Karen Birchard, U. ofBritish Columbia Stands Behind Professor Who




21. See Scott Smallwood, U. of New Mexico Disciplines Professor for His Comments to
Class on September 11, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 12, 2001, available at http://chronicle.
com/daily/2001/2001121201n.htm (quoting Associate Professor Richard M. Berthold).
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students to feel "scrutinized, blamed for the incident, or threatened. "' In other
words, campus administrators told professors to wait or to remain silent.'
Politicians thought that professors' and students' behavior was outra-
geous, atrocious, and unacceptable. Letter writing campaigns began in an effort
to silence campus critics. Some administrators may have sought to head off or
mollify critics from the outside. Other timid administrators feared what the
potential ramifications might be for their state budgets and donations by alums.
Some ominous signals came from a group called the American Council
of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), which released a report entitled "Defending
Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America, and What Can Be
Done About It."'24 The report included a list of 117 remarks by professors,
students, and others which, the report maintained, showed a blame-America-
first mentality, not in line with people outside the academic world.2" The
ACTA's ostensible purpose was to augment education in Western civilization
and American history.26 However, the ACTA report also stated that if institu-
tions failed to provide their students American and Western civilization his-
tory courses, "alumni should protest, donors should fund new programs, and
trustees should demand action. '27 This exhortation makes the ACTA report
a cause for concern.
Let me contrast the respective universities' responses to Professors Tho-
bani and Berthold. An academic vice president at the University of British
Columbia defended Professor Thobani's right to take a position because "the
cornerstone of a university is the ability to speak out on important issues."'
The academic vice president further stated that "[tlhe university is a place
where there must be a free exchange of ideas, and I hope people understand
that."
29
22. See Wilson & Cox, supra note 16 (quoting memorandum by administrator asking
faculty members to think hard about effects of their remarks).
23. Id. (remarking that some critics maintain that "now simply isn't the time... to say
anything that might offend others").
24. AM.COUNSELOFTRL&ALMNDEFENDINOOUCivjzATION: HowORUNvERI-
TIS ARE FAILNG AMMUcA AND WHAT CAN BE DoNE ABOUT IT, Nov. 2001, available at
http'/www.goacta.org/Reports/defciv.pdf.
25. See id. at 1 (stating that some faculty "pointed accusatory fingers, not at the terrorists,
but at America itself').
26. See id. at 8 (calling upon all colleges and universities "to adopt strong core curricula
that include rigorous, broad-based courses on the great works of Western civilization as well
as courses on American history, America's founding documents, and America's continuing
struggle to extend and defend the principles on which it was founded").
27. Id.
28. Birchard, supra note 18 (quoting Barry McBride, academic vice president of Univer-
sity of British Columbia).
29. Id.
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The University of New Mexico, on the other hand, disciplined Professor
Berthold.3° For his bad joke, he will have a letter of reprimand placed in his
file, he will be subject to rigorous post-tenure review, and he will be barred,
"for the immediate future," from teaching freshmen.31 While the chagrined
professor has apologized and apparently has acceded to the discipline, the uni-
versity, recognizing his right to protected speech, nevertheless grounded its
response on his irresponsible failure to recognize his students' "unique vulner-
ability" in theimmediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks.
32
During my career, there have been classroom discussions of the women's
movement, abortion, civil rights for minorities, and the Vietnam war. The
students' education has benefitted from robust exchanges on emotionally
charged issues. In fact, one important goal of higher education is to help
students learn to think for themselves. Administrators intolerant of dissent,
even expressed through bad jokes, seal the students in a hermetic quarantine.
Squelching debate ought to disturb every educator, both because it militates
against professors' contributions to the public dialogue on important issues
and because it undermines the work of higher education.
What is new in higher education since the Vietnam war last tested aca-
demic freedom? I have observed several tendencies that accompany the Urof-
sky court's constricted legal protection for exchange of ideas, thereby hinder-
ing the creation of more robust academic freedom and tolerance for dissent.
For example, the development of private fundraising leads administrators to
keep a low profile to avoid displeasing actual and prospective donors. Con-
sumer definitions of education emphasize student happiness, as if education
were a service industry with students as customers and consumers. Concern
about offensive behavior led many colleges to adopt speech codes and sexual
harassment policies. Theorists claim free speech to be a mask for the exercise
of power. Finally, the American Association of University Professors seems
to speak with a diminished voice for academic freedom and academic values
as compared to the 1960s and 1970s. That the academic "common law" is
precarious is well illustrated by the University of Virginia administration's
brazen series of decisions to ignore academic due process procedures and to
discharge a tenured (and chaired) professor of physics after a Kafka-esque
series of meetings with administrative staff.3
30. See Smallwood, supra note 21 (noting that University of New Mexico disciplined
Richard M. Berthold, associate history professor, for joking to class of freshman on September
11 that "anyone who can blow up the Pentagon gets my vote").
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Report, Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of Virginia, AcADEME, Nov.-
Dec. 2001, at 49.
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Nevertheless, a culture of academic freedom is imperative if we are to
carry out the function of the university properly. Professor Owen Fiss suc-
cinctly stated that "[o]ur task is ... to address the great issues of the day and
to discover and then explain what justice requires, with the hope that some
day and in some way the truth will find a home in this world. "3 4 To strengthen
ourselves to advance this goal, we can draw on a store of courageous academi-
cians in earlier crises. I will cite but one example.
Anti-communism combined with opposition to civil rights in the late
1950s and early 1960s, when the North Carolina legislature passed the accur-
ately-named Speaker Ban Law." Proponents of the Speaker Ban Law in-
tended to isolate the Tar Heel State's impressionable campus youth from im-
proper communistic and integrationist influences.3 6 Chancellor, later Profes-
sor, Bill Aycock eloquently began his opposition to the speaker-ban move-
ment with remarks that carry conviction today:
A true university must seek out, examine, assemble, and interpret facts.
It must seek new ideas, new forms of knowledge, new values and new
artistic standards in orderthat mankind may continueto grow in understand-
ing and wisdom. A part of its creative mission is the duty to examine the
bases, the foundations, and the assumptions on which present knowledge
rests .... An institution engaged in higher education cannot be a univer-
sity if it undertakes to fix or freeze knowledge or doctrine merely because
it is suitable to some individual or group, however highly placed. By what
authority, may I ask, can a person say that he has found the final truth for
the youth of our land?... Those of us entrusted, for the time being, with
the leadership of the University of the people have a duty to express forth-
right concern when the freedom of the University is threatened .... If a
governor should attempt to dilute freedom in the University, it would be
tantamount to an attempt to destroy it. This institution was fathered by
rebellion against oppression and mothered by a vision of freedom. It has
become an instrument of democracy and a place in which the weak can
grow strong and the strong can grow greatY
34. Owen Fiss, Reply. A Third Reconsiruction?, in A COMMUNrrY OF EQUALs: THE
CONSTITUIONAL PROTCION OFNEWAMEuCANs 97,102 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds.,
1999).
35. Act of June 26, 1963, ch. 1207, §§ 1-2,1963 N.C. Ses. Laws 1688, amended byAct
of Nov. 17,1965, ch. 1, § 1, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 5, repealed by Act of July 6, 1995, ch. 379,
§ 17, 1995 N.C. Sen. Laws 933,942 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-199 (1999)).
36. See Oene R. Nichol, Essay, Bill Aycock and the North Carolina Speaker Ban Law,
79 N.C. L. Rnv. 1725,1729 (2001) (stating that "Communist" theory of Speaker Ban Law was
notion that "anyone who advocated civil rights and integration must be a Communist") (citation
omitted).
37. Id. (quoting Chancellor Bill Aycock's Speech to Alumni concerning future Speaker
Ban in North Carolina on June 6, 1960).
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As Ms. Smith has capably demonstrated, the Urofsky court has desiccated
legal protection for professors' academic freedom. As these lines go to press,
I cannot know how well the culture of higher education will deal with the
crisis of post-September 11. I hope that the University of British Columbia
administrator's attitude is typical and that the University of New Mexico's
unfortunate reprimand is an aberration.3" The way the University of South
Florida eventually responds to its president's improper move to dismiss Pro-
fessor Sami!AI-Arian may be the bellwether event that sets the direction of
future events.
9
Far from undermining American liberty and democracy, professors' exer-
cising their "academic freedom" to express their views on campus and in the
publicforum ought to advance their educational function while assuring more
discerning public policy decisions. A decision made after open discussion is
more likely to be a wise decision because all points of view were heard and
considered. Moreover, a decision made after consulting all concerned is more
likely to be perceived as legitimate.
As George Orwell wrote at the beginning of World War II, "Patriotism
and intelligence will have to come together again. It is the fact that we are
fighting a war, and a very peculiar kind of war, that may make this possible. "40
38. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (contrasting reactions of administrators
at University of British Columbia and University of New Mexico to professors' speech).
39. See Sharon Walsh, Blaming the Victim? A University Vows to Fire a Tenured Pro-
fessor Facing Death Threats in the Wake of September 11, Feb. 8, 2002, available at http'/
chronicle.com/weekly/v48/i22/22a01001 .htm (noting that fear of faculty groups that Professor
AI-Arian's case "may presage what kind of debate is to be allowed - both on campus and off-
in a time of war"). Professor AI-Arian might lose his job due to his controversial public
comments made on a national television show post-September 11.
40. GEORaE ORWELL,England YourEngland, in ACOULTONOFESSAYS 1,276 (1946).
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